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During the last two decades, scientists have grown increasingly aware that viruses 
are emerging from the human–animal interface. In particular, respiratory infections are 
problematic; in early 2003, World Health Organization issued a worldwide alert for a 
previously unrecognized illness that was subsequently found to be caused by a novel 
coronavirus [severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus]. In addition to SARS, 
other respiratory pathogens have also emerged recently, contributing to the high bur-
den of respiratory tract infection-related morbidity and mortality. Among the recently 
emerged respiratory pathogens are influenza viruses, coronaviruses, enteroviruses, 
and adenoviruses. As the genesis of these emerging viruses is not well understood 
and their detection normally occurs after they have crossed over and adapted to man, 
ideally, strategies for such novel virus detection should include intensive surveillance at 
the human–animal interface, particularly if one believes the paradigm that many novel 
emerging zoonotic viruses first circulate in animal populations and occasionally infect 
man before they fully adapt to man; early detection at the human–animal interface will 
provide earlier warning. Here, we review recent emerging virus treats for these four 
groups of viruses.
Keywords: emerging viruses, respiratory viruses, influenza viruses, adenoviruses, coronaviruses, enteroviruses, 
one health
inTRODUCTiOn
During the last two decades, scientists have grown increasingly aware that viruses are emerging 
from the human–animal interface. In order to combat this increasingly complex problem, the One 
Health approach or initiative has been proposed as a way of working across disciplines to incor-
porate human, animal, and environmental health. Of particular concern are emerging respiratory 
virus infections; in a recent seminar given by the National Institute of Health on emerging and 
re-emerging pathogens, nearly 18% were respiratory viruses (1). Among the recently emerged res-
piratory pathogens contributing to the high burden of respiratory tract infection-related morbidity 
and mortality, displayed graphically in Figure 1, are influenza viruses, coronaviruses, enteroviruses 
(EVs), and adenoviruses (Ads). In this report, we summarize the emerging threat characteristics of 
these four groups of viruses.
FigURe 1 | The geographical location of first detections (with known reservoirs) for recently emerged adenoviruses (Ads), enteroviruses (EVs), coronaviruses, and 
influenza viruses. Zoonotic (coronaviruses and influenza viruses) and non-zoonotic viruses (Ads and EVs) are shown. For zoonotic viruses, the hosts range from 
cattle, bats, chickens, camels, wild birds, cats, ferrets, goats, and humans (from left to right). The different sizes of the circles represent the number of human cases 
during the first outbreaks of the emerging respiratory viruses. Human cases of adenoviral infections are shown in blue; human cases of enteroviral infections are 
shown in yellow; human cases of coronaviral infections are shown in green; and human cases of influenza viral infections are shown in red.
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ZOOnOTiC inFLUenZA
introduction and epidemiology
Influenza viruses are RNA viruses that are members of the ortho-
myxovirus family and classified into four types: A, B, C, and D (2). 
As shown in Table 1, these four types of viruses are characterized 
by their immunologically distinct nucleoprotein and matrix pro-
tein antigens. Influenza A and B viruses consist of hemagglutinin 
(HA), which binds a sialic acid receptor, allowing the virus to enter 
the host cell, and neuraminidase (NA), which cleaves the sialic acid 
to release the virus. Similarly, influenza C and D viruses contain 
HA-esterase fusion glycoproteins that also allow for the attach-
ment of viral and cellular membranes. Antigenic shifts (influenza 
A only) in HA, NA, and the HA-esterase proteins contribute to the 
generation of novel viral strains. The host range of influenza viruses 
includes humans, birds, pigs, bats, and other livestock animals 
such as cattle and goats. The network of the influenza viral trans-
mission is complex with both inter- and intraspecies transmission. 
As the viruses continue to change in their genetic sequences, 
ongoing research is imperative in investigating the ecology of these 
viruses at the human–animal interface to control further spread of 




Influenza A virus H3N2 subtypes are frequently reported in 
swine, avian, and canine hosts that are responsible for highly 
infectious respiratory diseases in pigs and have been examined 
as a potential cause of influenza in humans. One study, examin-
ing the role of IAV in pigs at USA agricultural fairs, reported an 
average influenza A prevalence of 77.5% among 161 swine across 
all seven fairs (3). The genomic sequences of the viruses isolated 
from the swine were ≥99.89% similar to the H3N2 viruses isolated 
in humans. At these fairs, IAVs were detected at least 1 day before 
symptoms of the virus were observed in humans, indicating that 
H3N2 was transmitted from pigs to humans in this case.
H1N1
Since 2009, H1N1 virus has posed a significant threat to livestock 
workers and the greater community and has now become a seasonal 
influenza virus which circulates in humans. To explore the role of 
swine production facilities in the development of new swine-like 
influenza viruses, the spatiotemporal association between weekly 
TAbLe 1 | Characteristics of influenza viruses.
Characteristics influenza A influenza b influenza C influenza D
Virus structure Enveloped
Eight gene segments




Epidemiology Antigenic shift and drift Only antigenic drift Only antigenic drift Only antigenic drift
Known hosts Domestic and wild animals and avian species Humans, pigs, and seals Humans and pigs Humans and livestock (cattle, 
pigs, and goats)
Clinical manifestation Pandemic potential could cause high mortality Can cause severe disease 
in elderly and high-risk 
populations
Mild seasonal disease 
predominantly in children
Mild disease in humans 
across ages
Available diagnostics Rapid diagnostic tests (i.e., antigen detection); rapid molecular assays  
(nucleic acid detection); immunofluorescence; and cell culture
Real-time PCR and cell culture
Treatments NA inhibitors: zanamivir, oseltamivir, and peramivir.
Laninamivir investigational in USA.
Adamantanes: amantadine and rimantadine (not
recommended in USA due to resistance)
NA inhibitors: zanamivir, 
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influenza-like illnesses (ILIs) in humans and the location of pig 
farms was investigated in North Carolina over four influenza 
seasons (4). Analyses showed that the years of H1N1 pandemic, 
2009–2010 and 2010–2011, were closely related with earlier peak-
ing of ILI cases. These findings suggest that increased exposure 
to pigs was associated with earlier observations of the greatest 
number of human H1N1 cases.
In China, the transmission of influenza A between humans 
and pigs in six farms is being examined using a One Health 
approach, taking into consideration the interconnectedness of 
humans, animals, and the environment (5). Findings suggest 
that both A(H1N1)pdm09-like and swine-lineage H1N1 and 
swine-lineage H3N2 viruses are circulating in swine workers 
and that these viruses likely reassort and cross species within the 
pig farms; as such, additional research is needed to understand 
the relationship between cross species transmission of viruses in 
humans and pigs.
Avian Influenza
Avian influenza viruses are the largest group of influenza 
A viruses reservoired in aquatic birds or poultry. Although 
infrequently transmitted to humans, many cases have now been 
reported. Human infection with avian influenza can lead to 
serious health conditions, including death. The first outbreak of 
an IAV strain, H5N1, in humans occurred in Hong Kong SAR, 
China, in 1997, infecting 18 humans (6). The first identified 
cases of human infection with H7N2, another avian influenza, 
occurred in North America with two human cases reported in 
2002 (7). Another variation of the virus, H7N7, was the first 
avian influenza strain reported in Europe; it infected 89 humans 
in 2003. In 2004, the first human cases of H10N7 infections were 
observed in Africa (8). It is important to note that H5N1 virus 
outbreak occurred again in 2004, 7 years after its first outbreak 
in humans, infecting more than 650 humans and causing more 
than 386 deaths worldwide (9). The avian influenza viruses have 
continuously evolved, causing serious infections among humans 
across the world.
H7N9
H7N9 virus, a sporadic subtype of an avian influenza A virus, was 
first reported in humans in China in 2013. Since the first outbreak, 
China has been experiencing epidemics annually, with a cumula- 
tive number of 1,562 reported cases, 40% of which have led to deaths 
as of September 2017 (10). The incidence of the H7N9 infections 
has been increasing in both humans and poultry and in 2017 alone 
764 infections have been reported (11). Although H7N9 was first 
recognized as a low pathogenic avian influenza, two divergent line-
ages were detected in 2016—including a highly pathogenic avian 
influenza variant (12). According to the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), H7N9 is now recognized as the virus with 
the greatest potential to cause a pandemic due to its rapid genetic 
changes over the last 5 years. This further supports the need to 
improve disease control strategies and increase efforts to develop 
an effective vaccination strategy in the future as the spread of the 
H7N9 infection poses a threat to the poultry business.
Influenza D
Influenza D virus (IDV) is a novel influenza virus that is struc-
turally different from the other influenza viruses. IDV was first 
isolated in 2001 from pigs in USA and since the first report, viral 
infection has been reported in various locations in USA, Europe, 
and Asia. In a serological study, cattle workers and non cattle-
exposed adults in Florida were screened for IDV antibodies (13). 
Of the cattle workers, 97% of IDV seroprevalence was observed, 
while less than 20% was observed in non-cattle-exposed adults, 
suggesting a greater risk of IDV infection for cattle workers. 
During a swine respiratory disease outbreak in Northern Italy 
in 2015, the IDV genome was detected and isolated in both pigs 
and cattle herds (14). The viral genome isolated from the pigs 
was closely related to the viral genome isolated in USA in 2011. 
Additionally, the archived serum samples from 2009 had lower 
IDV antibody titers compared to the serum samples collected in 
2015. These findings suggest that the incidence of IDV infections 
in pigs may have increased over time, and therefore, IDV may 
pose a public health threat to the community.
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ZOOnOTiC COROnAviRUS
introduction and epidemiology
Coronaviruses are single-stranded, RNA viruses with a large 
genome in which mutations are very common. There are six 
human types of coronavirus: 229E, OC43, NL63, HKU1, which 
are often associated with mild upper respiratory tract infections, 
as well as the virus causing severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS-
CoV), both of which are zoonotic and have previously caused 
human disease. Interspecies transmission and the resulting 
emergent coronaviruses have been important factors in emerging 
respiratory disease as coronaviruses are known to infect feline, 
swine, canine, and bat species. Both MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV 
emerged from animal reservoirs and are now increasingly impor-
tant respiratory virus threats.
SARS-Cov
SARS-CoV first emerged as a global problem in 2003, when 
China informed the World Health Organization (WHO) of 305 
cases of atypical pneumonia in Guangdong Province. The WHO 
estimates that a total of 8,098 people worldwide became sick 
with SARS-CoV during the 2003 outbreak, and of them 774 
died (15). In USA, only eight people had laboratory evidence 
of SARS-CoV infection and, in all cases, infection was travel 
related. The secondary spread of SARS-CoV was characterized 
by transmission between patients and nurses, requiring interven-
tion from hospital infection control (16). Horseshoe bats are the 
host reservoir for SARS-CoV, but it is also postulated that other 
intermediate hosts such as civet cats, domestic cats, rodents, 
and swine may play an important role in transmission (17, 18). 
Recently, it has also been suggested that bats may play a role in the 
direct human transmission as bat SARS-like coronaviruses have 
been identified in some species (19).
In the past decade, teams from the Sabin Vaccine Institute 
and Baylor College of Medicine have been working toward the 
development of a vaccine for SARS-CoV. Although initial reports 
indicated that a vaccine may be ready for human clinical trials in 
2017, progress has been slow and few human SARS vaccine trials 
have been conducted to date.
MeRS-Cov
Middle East respiratory syndrome was first recognized in Saudi 
Arabia in 2012. Many cases were linked to travel to or residence in 
countries in and near the Arabian Peninsula. Symptoms include 
severe acute respiratory illness with fever, cough, and shortness 
of breath. There is limited human-to-human transmission of 
MERS-CoV, but exposure to camels is a risk factor for infection, 
with seroprevalences 15–23 times higher in camel exposed indi-
viduals (20). Despite this, major health care-associated transmis-
sion of MERS-CoV was reported in the Middle East and Korea, 
with outbreaks characterized by interhospital spread related to 
overcrowding and a lack of personal protective equipment (21). 
The total number of worldwide cases reported to the WHO as of 
January 9, 2017 was 2,067 MERS-CoV cases (22).
The cocirculation of CoVs in its animal reservoirs (camels 
and bats) raises important questions about the evolution of 
MERS-CoV. In a study conducted between 2014 and 2015 in 
Saudi Arabia, researchers found that dromedary camels share 
three CoV species with humans, including betacoronavirus 1, 
MERS-COV, and a CoV 229E-related virus (23). With the aim of 
reducing MERS-CoV transmission to humans, Haagmans et al. 
developed a vaccine for camels using a poxvirus vehicle (24). This 
vaccine has significantly reduced virus excretion among camels 
and conferred cross-immunity to camelpox infections (25).
enTeROviRUSeS
introduction and epidemiology
Enteroviruses are small, positive-sense, single-stranded RNA 
viruses in the Picornaviridae family. There are 12 species of EVs 
found globally, including EV A-J (EV-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and J) 
and rhinovirus A–C (RV-A, B, and C). With low replication fidel-
ity and frequent recombination, EVs have viral genetic diversity 
and a potential for cross-species infection. In February 2013, 
the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) 
approved changes to EV and rhinovirus species names after many 
of the human EV species were identified and isolated in non-
human hosts. Based on an analysis of Picornaviridae hosts listed 
in the ICTV database and subsequent studies of EV infection 
in non-human primates, there is growing evidence to indicate 
a potential for future zoonotic transmission between animals 
and humans (26, 27). Among the most important emerging res-
piratory viruses are EV68, EV71, coxsackieviruses, echoviruses, 
rhinoviruses, and polioviruses.
Enterovirus transmission occurs year-round, with seasonal 
peaks occurring in the summer and fall (June–October). Infants 
less than 1 year of age are most susceptible to infection, and males 
are at an increased risk for infection until the age of 20 years (28). 
The predominant mode of transmission is through a direct or 
indirect fecal–oral route; however, certain serotypes are trans-
mitted via the respiratory route, in tears, and via fomites (29). 
Immunity to EVs is serotype specific with most causing mild 
respiratory infections.
Rhinoviruses
Rhinoviruses are small, single-stranded RNA viruses in the 
picornavirus family that are responsible for more than half of all 
upper respiratory tract infections. In addition to exacerbating 
asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, rhinoviruses 
have also been associated with acute respiratory hospitalizations 
among children (30). In a large prospective study of US pneu-
monias, rhinoviruses have been identified as the second most 
prevalent etiology of pneumonia in children after respiratory 
syncytial virus and the first most common etiology among adults 
(31). There are more than 150 unique types of rhinoviruses. 
Among the three genotypes (A, B, and C) types A and C are most 
often associated with increased morbidity and bacterial second-
ary infection. In animals, rhinovirus type C has been associated 
with morbidity in chimpanzees (32). With an array of unique 
serotypes no vaccines or approved antiviral therapies have been 
commercially produced; however, experiments have suggested 
that vaccines and antiviral therapy may be possible (33, 34).
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ev D68
Enterovirus D68 has caused sporadic respiratory disease out-
breaks across Asia, Europe, and USA since 1960s; however, in 
2014, a nationwide outbreak of D68 was associated with severe 
respiratory illness in USA, resulting in 14 deaths out of a known 
1,150 cases (35). The CDC found 36% of all EVs tested during 
this outbreak were D68 and that patients with a history of asthma 
were found to be at a disproportionately increased risk of infec-
tion (36). One study of the 2014 outbreak found 59% of patients 
seen with EV-D68 in hospitals across Missouri, Illinois, and 
Colorado were admitted to intensive care units and 28% received 
ventilator support (35). In a study evaluating EVs in non-human 
primates, EV-D68 was detected as a recombinant zoonotic 
strain (37).
enterovirus 71 (ev71)
While there are several strains of coxsackievirus and EVs that 
can cause hand-foot-and-mouth disease (HFMD), EV71 is most 
commonly associated with severe disease outcomes. HFMD 
predominantly affects young children and is found worldwide 
but especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Although EV71 is not 
typically detected in animals, recent research has indicated that it 
infects non-human primates (38). Various antiviral therapies are 
currently under study, including small molecules, monoclonals, 
and antivirals. Vaccine candidates are also in development, with 
two vaccines currently available in China, which involve recom-
binant proteins, attenuated strains, inactivated whole-virus and 
virus-like particles, and DNA vaccines (39).
HUMAn Ad
introduction and epidemiology
First discovered in 1953 by Rowe et al., Ads are non-enveloped, 
double-stranded DNA viruses with 57 unique serotypes, some of 
which are specific for attacking the respiratory track, conjunc-
tiva, or gastrointestinal track (40). Key features of Ad infections 
include various symptoms of disease, including rhinorrhea, nasal 
congestion, cough, sneezing, pharyngitis, keratoconjunctivitis, 
pneumonia, meningitis, gastroenteritis, cystitis, and encepha-
litis. Illnesses may be asymptomatic, mild, or severe; however, 
immunocompromised patients and infants are at increased risk 
of severe morbidity and death.
Ad Outbreaks
Outbreaks of respiratory Ad infection are common in both 
military recruits and other large training groups, such as police 
trainees. Large persistent epidemics of Ad type 4-associated 
respiratory disease have been documented in various military 
trainees (41–43).
In response to the increased disease burden from Ad4 and Ad7 
in military recruits, Teva has made a vaccine available to military 
recruits in USA (42). Despite a 12-year hiatus from use, in late 
2011 oral Ad4 and Ad7 vaccines were reintroduced as an infection 
control measure for military recruits (42). After reintroduction, 
military recruits experienced a 100-fold decline in Ad disease 
burden, which accounted for the prevention of approximately 1 
death, 1,100–2,700 hospitalizations, and 13,000 febrile Ad cases 
per year among trainees (44).
emerging Ads
Outbreaks of Ad in the general population have been character-
ized by infection due to novel viruses such as Ad7h, Ad7d2, 
Ad14a, and Ad3 variants. These novel viruses are sometimes asso-
ciated with high attack rates and a high prevalence of pneumonia. 
Severe mortality is also prevalent among patients with chronic 
disease and in the elderly.
One of the most important novel serotypes, Ad14, previously 
rarely reported, is now considered as an emerging Ad type caus-
ing severe and sometimes fatal respiratory illness in patients of 
all ages (45). Beginning in 2005, Ad14 cases were suddenly identi-
fied in four locations across USA (46); the strain associated with 
this outbreak was different than the original Ad14 strain isolated 
in 1950s. The novel strain, Ad14a, has now spread to numerous 
US states and is associated with a higher rate of severe illness 
when compared to other Ad strains.
Novel Ad species have also been recently detected in cross-
species infections from non-human primates to man in USA 
and between psittacine birds and man in China (47). These 
cross-species infections indicate that Ads should be monitored 
for their potential to cause cross-species outbreaks. In a recent 
review of the risks of potential outbreaks associated with zoonotic 
Ad (48), it was noted that intense human–animal interaction is 
likely to increase the probability of emergent cross-species Ad 
infection. Additionally, the recombination of AdVs with latent 
“host-specific” AdVs is the most likely scenario for adaptation to 
a new host, either human or animal.
Currently, there are no FDA approved antivirals for Ad 
infection; however, the best antiviral success has been seen with 
ribavirin, cidofovir, and most recently brincidofovir an analog of 
cidofovir (49).
COnCLUSiOn
As it is clear that many emerging respiratory viruses have zoono- 
tic reservoirs, the design and implementation of effective control 
strategies are increasingly important. It has been suggested that 
avoiding direct contact with animals known to be zoonotic res-
ervoirs for these viruses is one potential strategy (50); however, 
in populations where contact at the human–animal interface is 
common this may not be an acceptable solution.
Complex disease problems cannot be solved by one institu-
tion or one discipline; as such, this presents opportunities to 
incorporate the One Health approach of working across disci-
plines to incorporate human, animal, and environmental health 
to solve complex problems. Although some of the respiratory 
viruses described here are found almost exclusively in humans 
(Ad strains), many of the most important emerging respiratory 
viruses are found at the human/animal interface. This suggests 
that strategies for novel virus detection should incorporate global 
surveillance at the human–animal interface to detect poten-
tially emerging zoonotic viruses. This surveillance will require 
6
Bailey et al. Threat Potential of Emerging Viruses
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org April 2018 | Volume 6 | Article 104
collaboration and cooperation among many stakeholders in 
order to address emerging and novel viral diseases.
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